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INSURANCE LAW
W. Shelby McKenzie* and
H. Alston Johnson*
LIABILITY INSURANCE

Obligation to Defend
In its well-reasoned opinion in Pareti v. Sentry Indemnity Co.,' the
supreme court provided the answer to a previously unresolved question:
whether the insurer could terminate its obligation to defend its insured
upon exhaustion of its policy limits. Under liability coverage, insurers
generally assume the duty to defend the insured. Usually, the insurer
agrees to pay the cost of defense in addition to the liability policy
limits. 2 Modern liability policies often contain a provision under which
the obligation to defend terminates upon full payment of the liability
policy limits. Prior to Pareti, Louisiana decisions had not determined
the validity and effectiveness of such provisions.
In Pareti, the plaintiffs brought suit against the Schnellers and their
liability insurer for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The
plaintiffs also named their own uninsured motorist (UM) carrier as a
defendant. The UM carrier filed a cross-claim for reimbursement against
the Schnellers. Upon settlement for the liability policy limit of $50,000,
the plaintiffs released the Schnellers and the liability insurer, but reserved
their rights against their own UM carrier. Subsequently, when the UM
carrier continued to pursue the cross-claim against the Schnellers,3 the
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1. 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988). See also, Bohn v. Sentry Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 357
(E.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1989).
2. Policies providing only excess liability coverage may not contain an obligation to
defend claims covered by primary insurance. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Fireman's Fund Am.
Ins. Companies, 339 So. 2d 28 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 896
(1977). Also, excess insurers who assume the defense of the insured usually do so under
policy provisions that seek to include defense costs within the liability policy limits. Cf.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United General Ins., 855 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1988).
3. The UM insurer continued to pursue the cross-claim after the release of the
Schnellers on the authority of Moncrief v. Panepinto, 489 So. 2d 938 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1986). Moncrief was later "disapproved" by Bosch v. Cummings, 520 So. 2d 721 (La.
1988), holding that the UM carrier had no independent right to seek reimbursement from
the underinsured tortfeasor after the tortfeasor was released by its insured.
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liability insurer advised the Schnellers that it would no longer provide
them with a defense, citing the following policy provision:
Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability
4
for this coverage has been exhausted.
The Schnellers filed a cross-claim against their liability insurer alleging breach of the duty to defend. This cross-claim was dismissed by
the trial court, but that judgment was reversed by the court of appeal
upon its finding that the policy provision was ambiguous. The supreme
court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court dismissing
the cross-claim.
The supreme court found that the insurance policy was not ambiguous in that it clearly expressed the intent to terminate the obligation
to defend upon exhaustion of the policy limits. The payment of the
settlement had exhausted the policy limits. The court concluded that the
policy provision was enforceable unless it was in conflict with statutory
law or public policy. Finding no applicable statutory law, the court
considered the public policy issue by reviewing a number of decisions
from other jurisdictions. It found that an apparent sharp division among
these jurisdictions arose out of an earlier generation of liability policies
that did not contain an express provision concerning the termination of
the duty to defend. The court suggested that the modern policy language
rendered that jurisprudence moot. It also distinguished the line of cases
from other jurisdictions that held that a mere tender of the policy limits,
not in payment of settlement or judgment, was not sufficient to terminate
the obligation to defend.' The insurer in Pareti had paid its policy limits
in funding a settlement. Finding that there were no public policy concerns
to affect its validity, the court in Pareti held that the unambiguous
policy provision was enforceable.
The court pointed out that it was not necessary to void an unambiguous policy provision to protect against the risk that an insurance
company would enter into an inappropriate settlement to avoid the
obligation to defend. It emphasized that the insurance company "is held
to a high fiduciary duty to discharge its policy obligations to its insured
in good faith-including the duty to defend the insured against covered
6
claims and to consider the interests of the insured in every settlement. ' '

4. 536 So. 2d at 420.
5. Some modern liability policies provide that the duty to defend will be terminated
only if the policy limits are exhausted "by payment of judgments or settlements." The
court in Pareti observed: "When an insurer merely tenders its limits without obtaining a
settlement of any claim for its insured, a strong argument can be made that it has neither
'exhausted' its policy limits nor fulfilled its fiduciary duty to discharge its policy obligations
to the insured in good faith." Id. at 422-23.
6. 536 So. 2d at 423. See Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1977);
Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 254 La. 429, 223 So. 2d 858 (1969).
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The court emphasized that "[a]n insurer which hastily enters a questionable settlement simply to avoid further defense obligations under the
policy clearly is not acting in good faith and may be held liable for
damages caused to its insured. ' 7 The court also pointed out that the
insurer who in good faith exhausts its policy limits must also "make
every effort to avoid prejudicing the insured by the timing of its withdrawal from the litigation." ' 8 Thus, while enforcing the unambiguous
policy provision, the court appropriately cautions insurers that they must
discharge their policy obligations in good faith as a prerequisite to the
enjoyment of the benefits of that provision.
Exclusion/Affirmative Defense
Recent decisions of the first and fourth circuits have announced
that exclusions in liability insurance policies are affirmative defenses that
must be specially pleaded. In absence of such pleading, the insurer
cannot offer proof in support of the exclusion. 9 These decisions seem
to indicate that the common practice of generally pleading that the
policy is the best evidence of its content will not be sufficient. While
the opinion is not entirely clear, it seems that the insurer in the first
circuit decision, who had failed to plead its exclusions, was not permitted
to assert that its exclusions were applicable to the facts actually presented
at trial.
These decisions seem unduly technical, particularly where the issue
is the applicability of an express exclusion to the facts proved by the
plaintiff asserting the claim. The exclusions are an integral part of the
contract under which the plaintiff seeks to recover and about which he
should be knowledgeable. If the plaintiff has any uncertainty as to the
position of the insurer, he can protect himself from ambush through
discovery. In light of these decisions, however, it is advisable for the
insurer to specially plead any specific policy provisions relevant to its
defense.
UNINSURED

MOTORIST COVERAGE

Self-Insurance
Under UM coverage, the insurer agrees to pay the insured the
damages that he is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of

7. 536 So. 2d at 423.
8. Id.
9. Griffin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, 542 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989); Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar Serv., 526 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs
denied, 530 So. 2d 84, 87, 89 (1988).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 50

an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. Generally, the policy definition of the uninsured motor vehicle excludes a vehicle owned by a
qualified self-insurer. 0 The validity of this policy provision was challenged in Jones v. Henry." The plaintiffs were allegedly injured as a
result of the negligence of the driver of a U-Haul truck. In compliance
with Louisiana's compulsory insurance laws, U-Haul had qualified as a
self-insurer in lieu of providing coverage for its vehicles under a motor
vehicle liability policy.' 2 The plaintiff's UM coverage with Hartford
excluded coverage for a vehicle "owned or operated by a self-insurer
within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law,
motor carrier law or any similar law."
While the supreme court recognized that becoming a qualified selfinsurer is one means of complying with the compulsory insurance law,
the court noted that the UM statute 3 does not contain any exception
for qualified self-insurers. It concluded that the UM statute and the
underlying public policy require that UM coverage be applicable unless
the responsible parties are adequately covered by a liability insurance
policy. The court indicated that the UM carrier should bear the risk of
insolvency of the self-insurer, subject to the right of the UM carrier to
4
seek reimbursement from the self-insurer upon payment of the claim.'
A footnote in Jones contained interesting dictum on the issue of
whether a qualified self-insurer is required to provide UM protection
for the occupants of its vehicle. The court observed that the UM statute

10. For example, the Personal Auto Policy drafted by Insurance Services Office and
used by many insurers contains the following:
However, "uninsured motor vehicle" does not include any vehicle or equipment:
Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle

11.
12.
13.

law
542
See
La.

...
So. 2d 507 (La. 1989).
La. R.S. 32:861-865 (1989).
R.S. 22:1406(D) (1982 & Supp. 1989).

14. In a series of decisions, the supreme court has recognized that the UM insured
may compromise with and release the tortfeasor and his liability insurer, thus preventing
further action by the UM insurer against the tortfeasor for reimbursement. Bosch v.
Cummings, 520 So. 2d 721 (La. 1988); Pace v. Cage, 419 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982); Bond
v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981); Niemann v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979). There does not appear to be anything in the rationale
for these decisions that would prevent the -applicability of the rule to a qualified selfinsurer. Thus, it would appear that a UM insured could settle with and release a qualified
self-insurer and still pursue a claim against his UM carrier. Such a release would seem
to preclude further claims for reimbursement by the UM carrier.
What credit against the total damages would the UM carrier receive from the insured's
settlement with the self-insurer? Presumably, the UM carrier would be entitled to credit
for at least the full amount paid by the self-insurer. Upon showing that the settlement
was for less than reasonable amount with a solvent self-insurer, perhaps the UM carrier
should receive greater credit.
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and the compulsory security law, "when read together, lead to no other
conclusion except that there must be a policy of insurance in effect in
order to trigger the requirement of UM coverage." 5 Because the issue
was not before the court, however, the court stated that it would not
express an opinion concerning whether such an arrangement contravened
6
the public policy underlying the UM statute.
JUDICIAL INTEREST

Liability Insurance
Recent decisions indicate some confusion concerning the responsibility of a liability insurer for the payment of judicial interest. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:4203 provides that legal interest on all judgments,
"sounding in damages, 'ex delicto,"' shall be due from the date of
judicial demand. Louisiana Civil Code article 2924, as amended effective
January 1, 1988, provides for an annually adjusted interest rate. Liability
insurance policies commonly provide for the payment of judicial interest
as a supplementary benefit to the policy limits for bodily injury and
property damage. For example, a typical supplementary payments provision requires the insurer to pay:
all interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein which
accrues after entry of the judgment and before the company
has paid or tendered or deposited in court that part of the
judgment which does not exceed the limit of the company's
7
liability thereon.
Notwithstanding such policy language under which the insurer assumes the obligation for interest only from entry of judgment, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Soprano v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.," held that the insurer, under the provisions of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:4203, is liable for pre-judgment interest on its policy
limits from the date of judicial demand. More recently, in Burton v.

15. 542 So. 2d at 510.
16. Several cases have found that a qualified self-insurer was not required to provide
UM protection. Hebert v. Williams, 526 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 532
So. 2d 150 (1988) (lessee, as qualified self-insurer, was not required to provide UM
coverage to the occupants of leased vehicles); Harrison v. Petri, 468 So. 2d 666 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985) (self-insured with excess coverage is not required to provided UM
protection within the self-insured's retained limit); Jordan v. Honea, 407 So. 2d 503 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 409 So. 2d 654 (1982).
17. See Doty v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 186 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 249 La. 486, 187 So. 2d 451 (1966).
18. 246 La. 524, 165 So. 2d 308 (1964).
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Foret,'9 the supreme court held that legal interest under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:4203 accrues from the date judicial demand is made against
any solidary obligor. Thus, interest commences to run against the insurer
from the date of. judicial demand against the tortfeasor even though
the liability insurer or the UM carrier is not joined in the action until
a later date.
Doty v. Central Mutual Insurance Co."° is generally recognized as
the landmark decision for the proper interpretation of the insurer's
obligations to pay interest under the statute and under the supplemental
payments provision of the insurance policy. The insured was held liable
for damages in the amount of $25,000 in solido with the insurer for
its policy limits of $10,000. The insurance policy contained the supplemental payments provision quoted above requiring the insurer to pay
interest on the entire amount of the judgment that accrued after entry
of the judgment. The court held that the insurer, under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:4203, was liable for interest on the amount of its policy
limits of $10,000 from date of judicial demand. With respect to the
$15,000 award in excess of the $10,000 policy limits, the insurer, under
the supplementary payments provision, was obligated to pay interest
only from the date of entry of the judgment.
While Doty has been applied correctly in some recent cases, 21 other
cases purporting to follow Doty have mistakenly cast the insurer with
legal interest on the full amount of the judgment from date of judicial
demand.22

19. 498 So. 2d 706 (La. 1986).
20. 186 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied; 249 La. 486, 187 So. 2d 451
(1966).
21. Fletcher v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987)
(simplified policy form); Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987). See also Smith v. Zale Indem. Co., 538 So. 2d 1142 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1989). The Zale policy provided:
If we decide that the award was a mistake, we will pay the costs to appeal to
a higher court, including interest on the award plus the cost of any bond that
may be required.
Even though it did not tender its policy limits until almost two years after judgment,
Zale was held liable only for interest on its policy limit from date of judicial demand
because it had not appealed. The court held that Zale was not liable for interest on the
entire amount of the judgment, after entry of judgment, because the policy provision
differed from the supplementary payments provision in the Doty case.
22. While stating that they are following Doty, courts in two recent cases cast insurer
for interest on the full amount of the judgment from date of judicial demand. Petry v.
Richard, 532 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 382 (1988); Fowler
v. Roberts, 526 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 531 So. 2d 257 (1988), writ
denied, 531 So. 2d 278 (1988) (writ applications involved other issues). The court in
Hellmers v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 503 So. 2d 174, 180 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
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Under the supplementary payments provision quoted above, the
insurer's obligation for interest on the entire amount of the judgment
after entry of the judgment terminates upon the payment, tender, or
deposit of the insurer's limit of liability. 23 The tender must be
unconditional 4 and in an amount sufficient to pay the policy limits plus
accrued interest on the policy limits.25
First Party Claims
In the en banc decision of the first circuit in River Road Construction, Inc. v. Canal Indemnity Co.,26 the court held that judicial interest
on a first party claim accrues from the date upon which payment is
due the insured under the statute regulating payment of insurance claims.
This case involved recovery under an insurance policy for damage to a
crane. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658, payment was due within
sixty days after submission of a satisfactory proof of loss. 2 7 Rejecting
the insurer's argument that interest ran only from date of judgment,
the court held that interest ran from the date payment was due, which
was sixty days after submission of a satisfactory proof of loss.
Uninsured Motorist Claims
It has been held that judicial interest on UM claims is due from
date of judicial demand on the UM carrier 21 or earlier demand on a
solidary obligor. 29 Since the payment of UM claims is regulated by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658,30 it could be argued under River Road

writs denied, 505 So. 2d 1141, 1149 (1987), held that the insured and insurer are solidarily
liable for all interest, observing that "[i]t is not the function of the trial court to apportion
the award between solidary defendants." Since the insurer is the solidary obligor of the
insured only up to the insurer's policy limits, the insurer should not be cast for judicial
interest on any amount in excess of its policy limits except to the extent that it expressly
assumes the obligation for the payment of such interest under its policy.
23. The expense of delay is illustrated by Dobson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
484 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). The insured, with liability limits of only $5,000,
was held liable for approximately $620,000. The insurer's six month delay after entry of
the judgment in tendering its $5,000 policy limits cost the insurer over $30,000 in judicial
interest.
24. Tippett v. Maryland Cas. Co., 536 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Petry
v. Richard, 532 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
25. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United General Ins., 855 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1988).
26. 538 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
27. La. R.S. 22:658 (Supp. 1989) was amended to reduce the time period to thirty
days by 1989 La. Acts No. 638.
28. Ainsworth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 709 (La. 1983).
29. Burton v. Foret, 498 So. 2d 706 (La. 1986).
30. McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 475 So. 2d 1085 (La. 1985); Hart v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 437 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983).
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that interest should commence upon expiration of the payment delay
after submission of satisfactory proof of loss.
A first circuit decision misapplied the liability insurance jurisprudence
and concluded that the UM carrier was liable for legal interest on the
full amount of the judgment-even the amount in excess of its UM
policy limits." There does not appear to be any justifiable basis for
casting the UM insurer with legal interest on any amount other than
the amount of the judgment rendered against the UM carrier.
LIFE INSURANCE

There were no startling developments during this term in the life

insurance field, but there are three decisions that deserve a very brief
comment.
Defense of Intoxication
Louisiana law permits a health and accident insurance policy (which
may contain accidental death benefits) to contain an exclusion of cov-

erage if the loss is sustained "in consequence of the insured's being
intoxicated" at the time of. the loss.32 There are surprisingly few cases
reported at the appellate level in which policy provisions based upon
this statutory authority have been interpreted. In one case decided in
1969, recovery was denied when the insured died in a one-car accident
that occurred when his motor vehicle failed to negotiate a curve; his
blood alcohol content was 0.29016. 33

During this term, an appellate court reversed the trial court and
permitted recovery under the accidental death portion of a health and
accident policy, concluding that the insurer had not discharged its burden
of proving that the injury and subsequent death were caused by intox4
ication.

31. Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982). In holding the UM insurer liable for legal interest on the full amount of the
judgment, not just its policy limits, from date of judicial demand until paid, the court
cited O'Donnell v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
However, O'Donnell, a liability case, correctly stated and applied the Doty rule:
The statute [La. R.S. 13:4203] does not, however, require an insurer to pay
legal interest on any amount beyond its policy limits or on the amount of the
judgment against it. Accordingly, numerous cases hold that an insurer is liable
for legal interest from judicial demand only on the amount of the judgment
against the insurer and not on the amount of any excess judgment against the
insured.
Id. at 93.
32. La. R.S. 22:213(B)(10) (1982).
33. Matthews v. All American Assurance Co., 226 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ refused, 254 La. 923, 228 So. 2d 483 (1969).
34. Moore v. Central American Life Ins. Co., 535 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988).
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The decedent was described as an "emaciated" lady, fifty-one years
of age and weighing only ninety pounds. She seemed to have had a
number of serious medical problems in her life, and it seems fair to
conclude from the facts that there was some evidence of an alcohol
problem in her past. On the day in question, she was in a supermarket
when she fell, striking her head on a shelf. She was promptly admitted
to a hospital, and transferred to another, but died the next day of
extensive intracerebral hemorrhaging. A blood alcohol determination of
0.09% was obtained, but the precise time that the blood was drawn
could not be determined.
The policy provided that there was no coverage for "death or injury
to the insured caused . . . (3) while the insured is under the influence
of intoxicating beverages . . . ." The trial court had held that the death
satisfied other policy requirements as to its accidental nature, but that
the intoxication exclusion defeated recovery. The appellate court took
a different view, concluding that the insurer had not discharged its
burden of proof, either as to intoxication or causation.
The appellate court placed great significance on the lack of specificity
with respect to the time the blood sample was drawn, but it would
appear that the blood alcohol content could only have gone down over
time. Thus the 0.09% finding should certainly have been less than, or
equal to, the content at the time of the injury. The appellate court was
more appropriately concerned with the lack of testimony about how
that level would affect a person's ability to function, but once again
the frail nature of the decedent's body would appear to indicate that
she might have been impaired even by this relatively small amount of
alcohol. And finally, the appellate court noted the testimony of eye
witnesses, who generally concluded that they could not tell whether the
decedent was intoxicated or simply ill on the day in question.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant had discharged
its burden of proof on the intoxication issue, the appellate court then
concluded that it had not established that the fall was due to the
intoxication. This would be a difficult burden in any event, and the
lack of any eye witnesses to the fall itself did not help the defendant's
case.
This should probably have been a close case, and it appears that
the defendant did a reasonable job of discharging its burden. Perhaps
the very small face amount of the policy ($5,000.00) permitted the
appellate court to be more lenient toward the plaintiff's claim for death
benefits than would otherwise have been the case.
Misrepresentation
Another case must be added to the fairly long list of unsuccessful
defenses by an insurer on the issue of material misrepresentation. During
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this term, in Swain v. Life Insurance Co. of Louisiana,35 the court was
faced with a claim for recovery under a credit life policy by the spouse
of a man who contracted lung cancer and died very shortly after the
inception of the policy. By all accounts, he had not been in particularly
good health in the years preceding the policy in question, and indeed
had appeared on crutches at the car dealership at which the credit life
policy was sold. But he was never asked anything about his health
problems by the agent who sold the policy.
The trial court had denied recovery, but the appellate court dutifully
cited the jurisprudential amendment3 6 of the material misrepresentation
statute37 requiring the insurer to prove both an actual intent to deceive
and a material effect on the risk by the misrepresentation. The court
noted that the agent prepared the application and the policy, and did
not ask the insured any questions. Since the insured was never asked
to read the application form or fill in the information, the insurer failed
to discharge his burden of proving that the insured could have had the
intent to deceive necessary to justify a denial of coverage. The insurer's
arguments based on the "sound health" clause and the presence of a
pre-existing condition, both common assertions in health and accident
policies, as were likewise unavailing.
Exclusion for Death Resulting from Inhalation of Gas or Fumes
The extreme difficulty that a life insurer has in upholding certain
exclusions was demonstrated once again during this term in CapitalBank
& Trust v. Equitable Life.3 9 The insured was the owner of a business
and was found dead in the building following a fire. Only days before,
he and his wife had filed for bankruptcy, and it seemed apparent that
either he or someone else had intentionally, set fire to the establishment
on the day in question. Following an autopsy, the immediate cause of
death was given as asphyxiation, secondary to inhalation of toxic urethane smoke and fire and the burns due to the fire. It was stipulated
that the coroner would testify that the probable cause of death was
smoke inhalation.

35. 537 So. 2d 1297 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 895 (1989).
36. This judicial amendment process began with Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
233 La. 226, 96 So. 2d 497 (1957). See generally W. McKenzie & H. Johnson, Insurance
Law and Practice, § 257 in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
McKenzie & Johnson].
37. La. R.S. 22:619 (1982), which states these requirements in the disjunctive (either
intent to deceive or material effect on the risk), while the decisions state them in the
conjunctive (both must be proven).
38. See McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 36, § 291.
39. 542 So. 2d 494 (La. 1989). Due to the original plaintiff's insolvency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation had been substituted as a plaintiff on three insurance
policies which had been assigned to the bank as collateral for a loan.
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The policy in question excluded coverage for death resulting from
"any drug,, poison, gas or fumes, voluntarily or involuntarily taken,
" In a concurrence, Justice
administered, absorbed or inhaled ....
Lemmon observed that the most likely reason for the exclusion was to
deny coverage for suicide. Since it had been stipulated that the death
was not a homicide or a suicide, and since the term "fumes" would
not necessarily include inhalation of Smoke, an interpretation of that
ambiguity in favor of coverage was appropriate. That would be particularly true, in his view, when the exclusion was not primarily aimed at
accidental death by fire, but at assisting the insurer in proving the
difficult defense of suicide. Seen from this standpoint, the decision in
favor of coverage was probably unremarkable. But the majority opinion
preferred the rationale that "fumes" could not mean smoke, but rather
meant other forms of emissions, and thus the exclusion was inapplicable.
The basic distinction between "smoke" on the one hand and "fumes"
on the other is elusive at best, and it totally escaped the two dissenting
justices, who found all of this to be more hair-splitting than could be
justified.?
This opinion only confirms what most insurers already knew: suicide
exclusions are very difficult to enforce. It turns out that they are
especially difficult to enforce when there is no suicide.
HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Jurisprudence
The maturing of Cataldie4' continues. In 1984, on the basis of a
very difficult factual situation, the supreme court held in Cataldie v.
Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. that the cancellation of an
individual health and accident policy had been prejudicial to existing
claims of an insured, and required reinstatement of. the policy. 42 Over

the ensuing years, the decision was subjected to a number of refinements,
extensions, and contractions, not the least of which was its extension
43
to group policies under certain circumstances.
This term has been no exception, and there was an additional
interesting discussion in one of the cases about the role of the Employee

40.

See id. at 498 (Marcus and Dixon, JJ., dissenting).

41.

456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984).

42. See generally McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 36, § 286 (especially pp. 534-36
and the pocket part discussions).
43. See McKenzie and Johnson, Insurance, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49
La. L. Rev. 349, 362-63 (1988); McKenzie and Johnson, Insurance, Developments in the

Law, 1986-1987, 48 La. L. Rev. 293, 300-02 (1987); McKenzie and Johnson, Insurance,
Developments in the Law, 1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 475, 484-88 (1986).
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 44 in the application
of state law to certain insurance claims.
Two of the three decisions of note tilled some rather familiar ground.
In Guidry v. Shelter Insurance Co., 41 the plaintiff had purchased an
individual health insurance policy providing coverage for himself and
his family. The policy was renewable by the "timely payment of each
premium" monthly as it became due. The policy was in force when the
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, and the insurer paid
various medical expenses as they accrued. Unfortunately, due to his
injuries, plaintiff could not return to his employment and eventually
could not pay the premiums on the policy. On December 24, 1983 (about
six months after his injury), the policy lapsed by its own terms for nonpayment of premiums.
However, the policy also provided for "continuous loss" coverage,
even upon lapse, for charges for the same or related causes that occurred
during the policy period. The "continuous loss" provision, however,
extended only until the end of the "benefit period" under the policy,
which happened to be January 1, 1984. Under that provision, the insurer
paid the expenses incurred as a result of the automobile accident until
January 1, 1984, but declined to pay any other benefits.
Plaintiff's suit for reimbursement of medical expenses arising from
the automobile accident and incurred after January 1, 1984 was met by
a motion for summary judgment by the insurer. The motion was denied,
and the insurer sought relief from the appellate court by writ. The writ
was granted; the motion was granted; and plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
The appellate court properly made the distinction between cancellation of the policy and termination of the policy. 46 Cancellation refers
to the unilateral action of the insurer which ends coverage, with or
without cause, prior to the scheduled termination date of coverage;
typically, the term has also included the end of coverage on the basis
of non-payment of premiums. On the other hand, termination is the
ending of coverage on the basis of an event anticipated by, and governed
by, the terms of the policy itself, such as termination of employment
under a group policy. 47 Since the appellate court saw the instant matter
as one of termination rather than cancellation, it properly rejected
plaintiff's reliance upon the cancellation cases such as Cataldie.4s The

44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
45. 535 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
46. See generally McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 36, §§ 226 and 286.
47. See Mezzacappo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 523 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 531 So. 2d 473 (1988).
48. To be perfectly accurate, there was perhaps a "termination" in Cataldie, or
perhaps unilateral action by the insured to cease coverage, but it was deemed by the
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court held that the policy provisions relative to termination were clear
and unambiguous, and could be enforced as written.
In Perkins v. Shelter Insurance Co. ,9 a group health and accident
policy insured employees of an automobile dealership and their dependents. Premiums were paid on a fifty-fifty basis by the employer
and the employee. The employer paid the full premium in advance for
any given month, and then collected the employee's contribution out of
his paychecks during that ensuing month. The employer paid the full
premium in advance for the month of May, 1983, but the employee in
question was terminated before the end of that month. Thereafter, no
further payments were made on behalf of that employee, and specifically
no payment was made for the month of June, 1983.
On June 9, 1983, the employee's nineteen-year-old daughter was
injured in an automobile accident. On the basis of the termination of
employment in late May, 1983, and the lack of any premium for the
month of June, 1983, the insurer denied coverage and the employee
filed suit. The trial court granted relief, but the appellate court reversed.
Once again, the court properly recited the difference between cancellation
and termination. Finding that this was a termination under the provisions
of the policy rather than a cancellation, the court held that the statute
that sanctions lack of notice of a cancellation was inapplicable.
In this instance, the policy specifically provided that upon cessation
of the employment relationship, coverage under the policy terminated,
absent special circumstances not present in the instant case. The court
further noted that the employee had a right to convert his policy from
a group basis to an individual basis upon his severance from the employer's payroll, but chose not to do so.
The decision in Soniat v. Travelers Insurance Co.10 addresses the
cancellation/termination issue in a much more appealing factual situation
for the claimant. This time, a group health insurance policy had been
cancelled for non-payment of premiums, but the employer had collected
the premiums from the employee and failed to forward them to the
plan administrator and the insurer. Very shortly thereafter, the policy
was cancelled due to non-payment of premiums, and the employer went
out of business in May, 1984.
The employee's spouse was pregnant, and her time was fulfilled on
June 22, 1984. At the inception of the pregnancy, the insurance was in
full force and effect. By the time of the birth, all of the foregoing

supreme court to be a "cancellation" (and to be treated as such) because the insurer had
escalated the premiums to the point that the insured could no longer afford sufficient
coverage.
49. 540 So. 2d 488 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
50. 538 So. 2d 210 (La. 1989).
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events had occurred. When the insurer declined to pay for the expenses
of the delivery, the claimant brought suit. The trial court had granted
recovery, but the appellate court reversed on the strength of a policy
provision that fixed the last day of the month in which the employment
terminated as the last possible date of coverage. Since the baby was
born three weeks after May 31, 1984, the appellate court ruled that
there was no coverage.
The appellate court saw the matter as one of termination rather
than cancellation, and thus pretermitted the issue of lack of written
notice of cancellation." The supreme court disagreed. It held that the
policy had been cancelled for non-payment of premiums before the
employee's work relationship was terminated. Accordingly, it held that
Cataldie governed the case and that the cancellation with respect to a
covered dependent who was eight months pregnant was prejudicial to
the insured. Thus it reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of
the insured, though it denied penalties awarded by the trial court. The
award of attorney's fees, however, was affirmed on federal law grounds
rather than the state law grounds awarded by the trial court.
One other aspect of the decision is important. As a threshold matter,
the supreme court had to determine whether ERISA pre-empted the
provision of state law governing cancellation without prejudice, which
was the basis for the decision in Cataldie and which would be the basis
for the plaintiffs' recovery in Soniat. Analyzing Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux12 the supreme court held that the provisions of the
Insurance Code governing permissible provisions in group health and
accident policies were clearly specific to the insurance industry and thus
fell within the "saving" clause of ERISA which preserves such state
regulation of the insurance industry. 3 The court noted that the remedies
which the Soniats sought, unlike those sought by the claimant in Pilot
Life, were not generally available in other Louisiana contract cases, and
thus should be considered squarely within state regulation of insurance
matters.
The rationale of the court's decision in Soniat on the ERISA issue
should be studied carefully for its future influence on the pre-emption
issue in other cases.
Legislation
Most of the legislative attention paid to the insurance industry during
this term focused on the field of health and accident insurance. As a
further legislative refinement on the Cataldie problem, one act requires

51.
52.
53.

See Soniat v. Travelers Ins. Co., 517 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
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that if a group health insurance policy is cancelled by the insurer and
a covered member of the group has been diagnosed prior to the cancellation as having a terminal illness, and is not eligible for any other
benefits, the insurer must offer a conversion option to a major medical
policy with a maximum coverage not to exceed $1,000,000.00.4 Another
act addresses another part of the Cataldie problem by enacting a new
standard policy provision requiring that the insurer give notice to the
policyholder of non-payment of a given premium and of the grace period
allowed by the policy for payment of the overdue premium." The
provision must also state that the policy will be reinstated without penalty
if the premium is received by the end of the applicable grace period.
Act 409 continues the recent trend of statutorily-required types of
coverage under health and accident policies. If a policy affords coverage
for the "primary medical condition" of cleft lip and cleft palate, it
must also include "secondary conditions and treatments" such as oral
and facial surgery, restorative dentistry, speech therapy, audiological
assessments, psychological assessments, and genetic counseling for the
patient and the parents.16 While the trend of increasing statutory requirements of coverage may be laudable in the specific case, it may
prove counterproductive in the long term. If an insurer which provides
basic coverage for a certain condition is made to include other "secondary" conditions as described in an enactment such as Act 409, it
might decide to decline to cover the basic condition itself. Thus, a
legislative effort to expand coverage might in certain instances produce
a radical restriction in coverage.
Finally, the prescriptive period for claims for penalties and attorney's
fees under health and accident policies was shortened to one year by

Act 773 .7
PROPERTY INSURANCE

Jurisprudence
The two decisions of note during this term in the property insurance
field concern insurable interest and measure of loss in the case of
movables. Neither opinion requires more than a brief comment.

54. La. R.S. 22:228, as enacted by 1989 La. Acts No. 269, effective June 26, 1989.
The premiums on the conversion policy are to be determined in accordance with the
insurer's table of premium rates applicable to the' age and sex of the insured.
55. La. R.S. 22:213(A)(14), as enacted by 1989 La. Acts No. 426.
56. La. R.S. 22:215.8, as enacted by 1989 La. Acts No. 409.
57. La. R.S. 22:657(E), as enacted by 1989 La. Acts No. 773. The act almost certainly
has constitutional problems. It is contained in a bill which also provides a lengthy enactment
regulating collision damage waivers in automobile rental contracts. It is difficult to see
why the bill does not violate the constitutional requirement that each bill "shall be
confined to one object." La. Const. art. I1, § 15(A).
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A rather loose business arrangement in Johnson v. Midland Insurance
Co." gave rise to a dispute about the existence of an insurable interest
in a piece of heavy equipment. Johnson purchased a front-end loader
from Miller Tractor, financing the purchase through Ford Motor Credit.
Johnson procured an insurance policy from Midland covering fire and
other risks, with both Ford and Miller as additional loss payees. About
a year later, Johnson sold the loader to Havens. Havens paid a down
payment and then made monthly payments to Johnson, who transferred
them to Ford. The vendor and vendee agreed that Johnson would keep
the Midland policy in force. There seemed to be little formality to the
sale itself, and no assignment of the insurance policy.
The loader burned. Havens stopped payments. Johnson paid Ford
and Miller the amounts due and sued to recover under the Midland
policy. Midland was insolvent; Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association
(LIGA) was the successor defendant.
LIGA contended that Johnson did not have an insurable interest
after the sale, and therefore could not enforce the contract. 9 The court
noted that in a sale without a credit aspect, it would typically be held
that the seller did not retain an insurable interest, and a policy issued
to the seller might well not be enforceable. 60 But it also observed that
a seller with a continuing economic interest through some kind of security
has a sufficient insurable interest to permit the enforcement of the
policy. 6' In this instance, even though there was no promissory note or
chattel mortgage, there was probably a vendor's lien, and on that basis,
the court upheld the determination that Johnson could enforce the policy.
In Peoples Bank v. Insured Lloyds, 62 the dispute was over the proper
measure of damage in a partial loss of stored cottonseed due to fire.
After an investigation, the insurer paid the difference between the value
of the cottonseed before the fire and the salvage value. Because of the
perishable nature of the commodity, the salvage value was estimated by
an expert in such matters who had purchased the damaged commodity.
Unfortunately, the purchaser did not complete his payments for the
salvaged commodity, and the bank to whom the prior owner had assigned
his rights under the policy sued the insurer for the difference. Both the
trial court and the appellate court concluded that the individual who
arranged the sale of the damaged commodity (actually one of the three
insured owners) was acting as the agent of the insurer. Moreover, both

58. 541 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
59. La. R.S. 22:614 (1982).
60. See Union Cental Life Ins. Co. v. Harp, 203 La. 806, 14 So. 2d 643 (1943);
Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 315 So. 2d 826
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
61. See generally McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 36, § 314.
62. 537 So. 2d 1307 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 855 (1989).
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courts concluded that the insurer actually owned the damaged commodity
after the fire, and therefore should in effect suffer the loss of the nonpayment rather than effectively cast it upon the insured.
This seemed clear enough, but the dissenting judge pointed out that
the terms of the policy refuted this analysis. 63 In his view, which seems
correct, the policy left with the insurer, in the case of a partial loss,
the option to take ownership of the damaged property and forbade an
"abandonment" of any property to the insurer. 64Finding that the insurer
had never exercised the option to take the property, the dissenting judge
concluded that the property remained the insureds' and the risk of loss
under the contract of sale that they entered should properly remain with
them.
Legislation
Aside from a rather minor change in the standard fire policy provision as to cancellation of a policy for non-payment of premiums and
notice of such cancellation, 65 the legislation relative to property and
casualty insurance was easily the most important of the 1989 Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature. Act 638 of 1989 indubitably requires
more extended discussion than this space will permit. Effectively reversing
the specific exemption for insurance from the Unfair Trade Practices
Act that has existed for years, 66 this act defines and sanctions "unfair
claims settlement practices" by insurers. The various proscribed types
of conduct are too voluminous to analyze here, but suffice it to say
67
that they run the gamut of settlement practices in very broad terms.
If, after a hearing before the Commissioner of Insurance, it is determined
that the statute has been violated, a "monetary penalty" of not more
than $1,000.00 for each violation, but no more than $10,000.00 in the
aggregate, may be imposed. 68 However, if the violator "knew or reasonably should have known" he was in violation, the penalties are
increased to a maximum of $5,000.00 for each violation and $50,000.00
in the aggregate "in any six-month period." The act is effective for all
claims arising after midnight on December 31, 1989.

63. Id. at 1311 (Stoker, J., dissenting).
64. This clause is within the standard form of fire policy under La. R.S. 22:691(F)
(1982 & Supp. 1989).
65. 1989 La. Acts No. 657, amending La. R.S. 22:691(F), reduces the twenty-day
period normally required for notice of cancellation to ten days when the cancellation is
for non-payment of premiums.
66. La. R.S. 51:1406(1) (1987). See Alarcon v. Aetna Caualty and Sur. Co., 538 So.
2d 696 (La. App.5th Cir. 1989).
67. The list is contained in La. R.S. 22:1214(14), as amended and reenacted by 1989
La. Acts No. 638.
68. La. R.S. 22:1217, as amended and reenacted by 1989 La. Acts. No. 638.
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Act 638 is destined to become a very controversial part of the
Insurance Code. If nothing else, it will very likely add to the number
and scope of hearings by the Commissioner and his staff. It seems
certain that we will hear much more about it in the coming years.

